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ABSTRACT    
Other-perspective taking (OPT), distancing, time discounting as well as risk and loss 
aversion highly affect decision-making. Even though they influence each other, so far these 
cognitive processes have been unrelated or only partly related to each other in neuroscience. 
This article proposes a philosophical interpretation of these cognitive processes that is 
elaborated in the updated theory of Adam Smith's prudence (UTSP). The UTSP is inspired by 
Smith’s account of prudence and is in line with the neuroscientific and behavioral studies on 
OPT, distancing, time discounting as well as risk and loss aversion. The UTSP represents a 
framework aiming to interpret and connect these cognitive processes, while providing a 
consistent and empirically sound account of a “Smithianly” prudent style of decision-making. 
The two pillars of the UTSP are the shift of perspective in space and time (from the individual 
to others and from the present self to the future self) and loss aversion. On the basis of this 
theory, a normative updated theory of Smithian prudence is outlined (NUTSP). The latter is 
useful for moral philosophy for two reasons: firstly, according to preliminary evidence, it is 
effective in guiding the agent in decisional contexts in which her well-being is at stake and 
she can affect other people with her actions. Secondly, since the NUTSP is based on 
neuroscientific findings on decision-making, it has a sound empirical basis that prevents a 
source of alienation for the agent. 
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Introduction  
Other-perspective taking, distancing, time discounting as well as risk and loss 
aversion highly affect decision-making. Even though they influence each other [1-8], 
so far these cognitive processes have been unrelated or only partly related in 
neuroscience [9-10]. In this article, I fill this gap by suggesting a philosophical 
interpretation of these phenomena that is inspired by Adam Smith’s account of 
prudence and has received preliminary confirmation by neuroscientific and behavioral 
findings. In Smith’s system of ideas, prudence is the only virtue that is both a moral 
and an economic excellence: it is the appropriate care of oneself that in economics 
enables the betterment of one’s own material condition; in ethics this care of oneself 
leads to the betterment of one’s own reputation founded on skills, knowledge, and 
virtues. 
There are no studies of neuroscience or behavioral economics that explicitly 
investigate individuals’ prudent behavior. The word “prudent” is rarely used, and 
when it is used it is a synonym of “cautious” [11], “far-sighted” [12], or “self-
controlled” [13]; in conditions of risk, “prudent” is meant as “risk-averse” [14]. These 
traits are never studied together as a set of features that characterize a particular 
pattern of decision-making. In this article, I gather the above-mentioned traits and 
several others coming from the Smithian description of prudence in an updated 
definition of prudence. Then, I elaborate a descriptive theory of prudence, the updated 
theory of Smith’s prudence (UTSP), which is based on that definition. The UTSP is a 
theoretical framework organizing other-perspective taking, distancing, time 
discounting as well as risk and loss aversion in a single framework and explaining 
their mutual relations. The UTSP describes a style of decision making that can be 
defined “Smithianly” prudent. On the basis of the UTSP, I outline a normative 
updated theory of Smithian prudence (NUTSP), which I will show to be a feasible and 
effective guide for one’s own economic and moral betterment. 
 
1. Why interpreting several cognitive processes with Adam Smith’s account of 
prudence?  
An interaction between Smith’s prudence and various neuroscientific and 
behavioral studies on decision-making is possible because Smith’s account of human 
actions in the moral and economic domains is perfectly compatible with the 
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neuroscientific and behavioral findings on decision-making in these two domains, 
thanks to his empirical method of describing and explaining behavioral patterns that is 
inspired by the Newtonian scientific method [15: 202-205; 16: ch. 5; 17: 34–50, 92–
94]. 
Compatibility between Smith’s perspective and that of both neuroscience and 
behavioral economics is a preliminary condition that makes the choice of interpreting 
several empirical data with Smith’s concept of prudence possible, but it does not 
completely justify the choice; there are two reasons motivating the latter. The first is 
that Smith was one of the few philosophers to focus on prudence as a virtue of 
character that connects the moral and economic life of individuals and that explains 
some seemingly unrelated behavioral patterns. The second reason is that Smith’s 
account of prudence is confirmed by scientific findings on other-perspective taking, 
emotion regulation in the form of distancing, low time discounting, and behavioral 
aversion to loss and risk. The scientific corroboration of Smith’s ideas should not be 
read as a demonstration that Smith is a neuroscientist ante litteram, since his 
knowledge on the human brain is still anchored to the Cartesian dualism between 
mind and body [18: 32]. However, Smith’s account of several factors of the 
individual’s psychology and drives for action are still topical and proved to be 
reflected in the particular functioning of our brain. It is clear that Smith does not state 
that these factors are embodied in the brain; he rather affirms that they are principles 
of human nature, namely they are constant characteristics of every individual’s 
behavior ([19] II.i.5.10: 78; see also TMS I.i.1.1: 9; II.ii.3.4-5: 86-87; III.6.12: 176-
177).  
Some elements of Smith’s view of human decision-making, for instance sympathy, 
can be found in the accounts of other authors, such as Francis Hutcheson and David 
Hume. Therefore, it is not excluded that even such accounts are compatible with 
neuroscientific and behavioral findings. However, Smith provides a uniform and 
consistent view of human behavior, in which, with one principle, i.e. prudence, he 
explains and connects several moral and economic behavioral instances of 
individuals, which are: the adoption of the perspective of others, self-command, the 
aversions to risk and loss, and parsimony, which derives from long-sightedness and 
patience.  
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2. Smithian prudence  
Before outlining the theory of prudence, it is necessary to clarify Smith’s view of 
prudence and its components.  
Smith focuses on prudence in the first section of Part VI, which he adds to the 
sixth edition of the Theory of Moral Sentiment (TMS) (1790). In the first edition of 
the TMS (1759) (TMS IV.2.6: 189) and in its draft compiled in the 1750s, he presents 
a shorter description of this virtue [20: 54]. In An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations (WN), Smith deals with the utility of prudence when he 
discusses parsimony, which is the economic side of prudence, in the chapter on the 
accumulation of capital in book II ([21] II.iii.13-19: 337-338). 
According to Smith’s definition, prudence is «[t]he care of the health, of the 
fortune, of the rank and reputation of the individual, the objects upon which his 
comfort and happiness in this life are supposed principally to depend» (TMS VI.i.5: 
213). Prudence consists of taking care of various factors that constitute the 
individual’s happiness, including her physical well-being, the regard originating from 
other people, and the possession of what contributes to health, namely material goods, 
and what contributes to the esteem from others, namely material goods and a virtuous 
character (TMS VI.i.1-5: 212-213). Prudence is based on the adoption of the 
perspective of real or hypothetical individuals, requires self-command in the form of 
emotion regulation and patience, demands long-sightedness, and is affected by hazard 
aversion and the asymmetrical perception of pain and pleasure, as I will discuss in 
detail. 
 
2.1 Adoption of the perspective of other people and of the impartial spectator  
Two psychological mechanisms of Smith’s system are involved in prudence: 
sympathy and the impartial spectator.  
Sympathy is the fellow-feeling with an agent’s passion that an individual − the 
spectator or observer − experiences by imaginarily changing her place with the agent 
she is observing (TMS I.i.1.5: 10). In this process, the spectator does not imagine 
what she herself would do in the agent’s situation, but she imagines being the other by 
changing her own circumstances and traits with the agent. This is why sympathy is 
not a selfish principle. In Smith’s moral system, the agent’s conduct is justified only if 
the observer approves of it, and this occurs if the observer sympathizes with the 
agent’s emotions. The observer’s sharing of sentiments with the agent does not arise 
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from the view of the agent’s passion, but from the view of the situation that activates 
the passion (TMS I.i.1.10: 12).  
The impartial spectator is a psychological mechanism that the individual adopts 
when she evaluates her own actions. In this context, she imagines dividing herself into 
the person that acted and an impartial observer that judges that person (TMS III.1.6: 
113). The agent’s action is approved of and thus justified only if the impartial 
spectator sympathizes with her (TMS III.1.2: 109). 
When pursuing an object of prudence, firstly, the agent changes her perspective 
with that of other people or of the impartial spectator through imagination. Therefore, 
the imagined change of place makes the agent take a step outside her concern for 
herself and view her situation more objectively. Secondly, the agent verifies from the 
new stance if real or hypothetical observers would sympathize with her and thus 
approve of her action. Spectators never approve of actions in which the individual 
sacrifices others to her interests because they never sympathize with feelings that 
allow the agent to exploit others for the pursuit of her own happiness (TMS II.ii.2.1: 
83; TMS II.iii.1.5: 95-96). This because, according to spectators, she «is but one of 
the multitude in no respect better than any other in it» (TMS II.ii.2.1: 83). Therefore, 
though the individual «is much more deeply interested in whatever immediately 
concerns himself than in what concerns any other man» (ibidem), prudence is not an 
unrestrained care of one’s own well-being, as sympathy disciplines the pursuit of 
one’s own happiness [22: 63-64]. Prudence is a constrained care of oneself because its 
objects cannot be pursued at the expense of others, that is by sacrificing others for 
one’s own purposes or, in Kantian terms, by using others as means to one’s own ends 
[23: II, 37-41]. The prudent agent recognizes the actions respecting this demand by 
employing sympathy and the impartial spectator. 
The objects of prudence are one’s own personal interests and well-being, thus 
prudence is a self-regarding or self-centered virtue. Yet it includes a regard for others, 
as the consideration of other people’s feelings and judgments limits and directs the 
pursuit of one’s own well-being (TMS VI.concl.1: 262) [24: 134-137]. 
 
2.2 Self-command 
Acting according to the rules of prudence is a strenuous activity because it is 
difficult to limit our own needs and passions, as we feel them more intensely than 
those of other people (TMS VI.ii.1.1: 219). For this reason, according to Smith, self-
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command is required for the implementation of the constrained care of oneself (TMS 
VI.iii.1: 237). Self-command is the ability to exercise discipline over one’s own 
feelings (TMS III.3.23-25: 145-147). It is fundamental to prudence because it limits 
the selfish passion that we feel when we assess a conduct of ours in which our 
personal interests influence our judgments and thus oppose the impartial spectator and 
other people’s judgments. Smith often illustrates the regulation of one’s own feelings 
by using expressions and terminology proper to music and harmony. For instance, in 
TMS I.i.4.7: 22, he states that the person exercising self-command «must flatten, if I 
may be allowed to say so, the sharpness of its natural tone, in order to reduce it to 
harmony and concord with the emotions of those who are about him». 
Smith describes two strategies of self-command: in medium self-command, we try 
to adopt the perspective of our company and in this way we calibrate our feelings in 
such a way that we feel for ourselves no more than what our peers feel for us (TMS 
III.3.24: 146). In high self-command, we overcome the need of real watchers by 
adopting the impartial spectator’s perspective. If this practice becomes habit, we 
begin thinking and feeling like the impartial spectator (TMS III.3.25: 146-147).1 
 
2.3 Patience 
Smith’s prudence requires self-command even in the form of patience, which 
consists in attributing the same value to a present pleasure or pain and to a similar 
future pleasure or pain. When the prudent agent faces a decision between a present 
pleasure and a greater one in the future, her desire for present gratification is more 
vivid and intense than that for future pleasure. Hence, she has a natural preference for 
immediate gratification (TMS IV.2.8: 189-190), i.e. she naturally attributes greater 
value to this option. However, thanks to self-command, she reduces the intensity of 
the desire for present enjoyment; consequently, she assesses the two pleasures from 
the same distance and thus chooses the greater delayed gratification (TMS VI.i.11: 
215). Patience is an intertemporal concept establishing an ordering between the 
agent’s present and future needs. Along with long-sightedness, it concerns 
intertemporal choices, namely choices in which the outcome of the options is 
delivered in different times.  
                                                      
1 There is a third strategy to modulate one’s own feelings, according to Smith. However, since this 
strategy is a mere shift of attention and is typical of people with low self-command (TMS III.3.23: 
145), it is not dealt with here. 
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2.4 Long-sightedness 
As patience is a preference for greater pleasures in the future over smaller ones in 
the present, it is tightly linked with another component of Smith’s prudence: long-
sightedness. The latter is the ability to discern the consequences of our actions and the 
advantage or detriment that is likely to result from them (TMS IV.2.6: 189). Long-
sightedness and patience are the traits that make the prudent agent assess her own 
happiness from a temporally extended perspective. In the first edition of the TMS, in 
which Part VI had not yet been inserted, prudence was defined as the sum of long-
sightedness and self-command in the form of patience (ibidem). This definition 
remains in all the subsequent editions. Patience and long-sightedness render the agent 
parsimonious (TMS VI.i.12-13: 215) and indeed they are defined the most useful 
qualities to the individual by Smith (TMS IV.2.6: 189). 
 
2.5 Hazard aversion  
In the achievement of happiness, prudence entails hazard aversion, namely a 
dislike to that which puts the objects of prudence at risk, and a preference for security. 
In fact, prudence «is rather cautious than enterprising, and more anxious to preserve 
the advantages which we already possess, than forward to prompt us to the acquisition 
of still greater advantages» (TMS VI.i.6: 213).  
It may appear that hazard aversion hinders patience, as waiting for a delayed 
gratification entails a degree of risk that the present pleasure does not entail. Yet 
preference for security and hazard aversion do not imply that the prudent agent is 
blocked in and completely satisfied with her status quo. For, firstly, security is only 
one of the objects of prudence, hence the prudent agent’s hazard aversion is not 
infinite but limited (TMS VI.i.6: 213); secondly, the prudent agent is eager to 
undertake new projects or enterprises if they are well concerted and prepared (TMS 
VI.i.12: 215). This is because, according to Smith, one of the fundamental principles 
of human nature is the desire to better one’s own condition, and prudence, as the care 
of one’s own condition, is prompted by this desire (WN II.3.28: 341-342; TMS VI.i.7: 
213). In the economic sphere, hazard aversion makes this betterment slow and gradual 
as the prudent agent improves her condition in safe ways, namely through real 
knowledge and skill in her profession, assiduity and industriousness in her 
occupation, and frugality and parsimony in her expenses (TMS VI.i.6: 213). 
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Parsimony, i.e. the union of patience and long-sightedness, renders this betterment 
continuous, as parsimony makes possible the progressive accumulation of capital 
(TMS VI.i.12: 215; WN II.iii.14-16: 337). Hence, in the economic side of Smith’s 
prudence, patience and long-sightedness are not nulled by hazard aversion because 
the latter is not infinite and it is restrained by the desire to better one’s own condition.  
In the moral sphere, the betterment attained through prudence is a good reputation 
that is founded on real knowledge, skills, and virtues (TMS VI.i.4: 213; VI.i.7: 213). 
Since Smithian prudence leads to moral and economic betterment, it is an excellence 
of character both in the moral and in the economic spheres in which the agent acts.   
 
2.6 Asymmetrical perception of pain and pleasure 
According to Smith, the origin of hazard aversion is to be found in human natural 
constitution, since individuals perceive adversity and prosperity asymmetrically, 
being more sensitive to pain than to pleasure. Therefore, the loss of one of the objects 
of prudence brings the individual far below her natural state of happiness compared to 
the elevation attained by the gain of one of these factors (TMS I.iii.1.8: 45; III.2.15: 
121).  
As individuals feel more directly and intensely their own emotions than those of 
others, this aversion to loss only concerns one’s own loss: the individual is naturally 
more concerned with the loss her little finger than with the ruin of a hundred million 
of people in a distant country such as China, according to Smith. However, the 
impartial spectator prevents that this preference be adopted and that the selfish 
impulses prevail over the concern for others (TMS III.3.4: 136-137).  
 
In conclusion, prudence consists in the pursuit of one’s own present and future 
happiness in condition of low uncertainty and under the constraint of not using others 
to pursue this happiness. The six components of prudence are: the adoption of the 
perspective of others (which can result in sympathy), self-command as regulation of 
emotions, self-command as patience in intertemporal choices, long-sightedness, 
aversion to hazard, and the asymmetrical perception of pain and pleasure. Each of 
these is very close to a cognitive process investigated by neuroscience and behavioral 
economics. In the next section, I will integrate Smithian prudence with the cognitive 
processes corresponding to it.  
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3. The cognitive processes corresponding to Smithian prudence 
3.1 Other-perspective taking 
The adoption of another person’s perspective that characterizes Smithian prudence 
is very close to the notion of other-perspective taking (OPT). The latter is a form of 
cognitive empathy. Cognitive empathy is the ability to cognitively understand other 
people’s mental states and requires theory of mind (ToM), namely the capacity to 
infer and represent another person’s mental state. Within the concept of cognitive 
empathy, Shamay-Tsoory 2011 [25] distinguished cognitive ToM, if ToM is about 
making inferences on other people’s beliefs, from affective ToM, if the inferences are 
about other people’s emotions. In contrast, emotional empathy is the capacity to 
understand other people’s feelings by sharing their affective state. 2  In emotional 
empathy, the empathizer’s affective state is elicited by the directly perceived, 
imagined or inferred feeling of another being, it approximates that of the target, and 
the empathizer is aware that the source of her affective state is the target [26-27]. 
Emotional empathy enables the sharing of the other’s feelings usually through 
bottom-up processes of empathy, such as affective and somatic resonance, but can 
also involve top-down processes of empathy, such as ToM and OPT [25]. In healthy 
subjects, cognitive and emotional empathy work together [26: 516]. 
OPT is the adoption of the point from which another individual perceives reality. It 
consists of three components: ToM, imagining being another person, and contextual 
appraisal. OPT is grounded in complex cognitive processes such as a) regulation of 
the emotion and cognition that are elicited by the other person, which can result in 
emotional empathy, even though OPT does not automatically become a sharing of 
emotions because – like Smithian sympathy – it entails an evaluation of the situation 
[28-30]; b) cognitive flexibility, which is the ability to shift a course of action or 
thought according to the demands of the situation; c) attention filtering; d) monitoring 
of thoughts and actions [31]. 
More precisely, the Smithian adoption of other people’s perspective is very similar 
to a type of OPT called imagine-other perspective or other-oriented perspective 
taking [32], which consists in imagining how we would feel if we were the other, 
having the other’s needs, thoughts and feelings [33-34]. Its opposite is the imagine-
                                                      
2 Singer and Tusche 2014 made a similar distinction between a cognitive system and an emotional 
system of empathy, but labelled cognitive empathy as mentalizing, ToM or cognitive perspective 
taking, while emotional empathy is simply called empathy [26].  
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self perspective, which consists of imagining how we would feel if we were in another 
person’s position. In Smith’s account, the prudent agent never uses other people as 
means to pursue her own happiness not only because she searches for other people’s 
approbation and she knows that they do not approve of actions exploiting individuals, 
but also because she has employed the imagine-other perspective. In fact, as in that 
type of OPT she imagines how she would feel if she were another individual, she 
focuses on the other’s needs and interests and she relativizes hers. The agent can also 
imagine exchanging her perspective with a person possessing a high degree of 
impartiality, a sort of impartial spectator, in order to select the action that is judged 
proper from the most objective perspective. 
In OPT, the individual simulates the experience of being another person through 
imagination. The conscious simulation of the experience of being another person 
offsets the lack of knowledge and details about the person whose perspective the 
agent is adopting. Similarly, in Smith’s psychological account of sympathy, the latter 
is based on an imaginary change of place. Imagination has a pivotal role in Smith’s 
whole moral system, because if the agent lacks the capacity for imagination, she 
cannot form an idea of other people’s feelings; consequently sympathy cannot occur 
and moral judgments deriving from the approbation or disapprobation of an act 
cannot be formulated [35: 310-311; 36: 22-35]. 
The mirror neuron system is one of the resources useful in understanding the 
others’ mental states that can support OPT. The mirror neuron system is composed of 
the neurons that discharge both when an agent sees another person performing an act 
and when she performs the very same act (for a review, see [37-38]). There is also 
limited evidence of a similar mirror mechanism for basic emotions at single-cell level 
in humans [39-40].3 As, in order to take other people’s perspective, one needs to 
understand what the other person is aiming at or feeling, the mirror neuron system 
supports OPT by providing information on other people’s basic intentions and 
emotions through an unconscious simulation of their actions and facial expressions 
respectively [35: 304-306; 41: 193]. However, it should be noted that, contrarily to 
the mirror neuron system, OPT is a conscious stimulation, is not automatic, and does 
not necessarily result in the sharing of emotions.  
 
                                                      
3 At neural-system level, evidence for physiological mechanisms of mirroring emotions comes from a 
greater number of experiments than the evidence at a single-cell level [26-27, 31]. 
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3.2 Distancing 
In Smith’s account of prudence, medium self-command requires the consideration 
of other people’s feelings and thoughts; high self-command needs the consideration of 
the impartial spectator’s mental state. In other words, self-command is based on the 
ability to adopt the perspective of others. 
The two strategies of self-command described by Smith are very similar to a type 
of emotion regulation that in psychology and neuroscience is called distancing or 
detachment or self-focused reappraisal. Emotion regulation is a strategy of self-
control comprising the deliberate initiation, modification, maintenance or inhibition of 
the occurrence, form, intensity or duration of emotions [42-43]. Reappraisal is a form 
of emotion regulation that consists in reinterpreting the meaning of a stimulus, by 
changing how one thinks of a situation, in order to decrease or increase its impact 
(respectively down- or up-regulation of emotions) [44]. Distancing is a tactic of 
reappraisal that exploits OPT, namely it is one of the specific ways in which the 
strategy of reappraisal is implemented [43: 9]. Distancing takes two directions: 
viewing an event from a detached third-person perspective − usually in order to 
down-regulate an emotion − or from a vivid first person perspective − usually in order 
to up-regulate an emotion [1, 43, 45]. Distancing in the form of the third person 
perspective is the typical strategy adopted by high and medium self-command 
individuals, even though, in the case of high self-command individuals, the third 
person is more abstract because it is the impartial spectator.  
 
3.3. Low time discounting 
Patience is a component of Smithian prudence that employs intertemporal self-
command. If patience is considered together with long-sightedness, it is very similar 
to what in economics and neuroscience is referred to as low time discounting or low 
temporal discounting. The latter is the phenomenon by which people value an 
immediate reward more than if they were to receive the same reward in the future, 
because they discount its future utility in a hyperbolic or quasi-hyperbolic manner 
with increasing delay-to-reward [46-51]. Long-sightedness and patience belonging to 
Smithian prudence render the agent a low temporal discounter, that is an individual 
who discounts future outcomes little in intertemporal choices.  
Smith’s explanation of the process underlying the gratification delay, in which 
self-command limits the intensity of the desire for present pleasures, is the same 
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pointed out by the latest neuroscientific findings on temporal discounting. In fact, 
contrarily to the axiom of revealed preferences of mainstream economics, the activity 
of evaluating options is detached from that of choosing an option: Figner et al. (2010) 
[52] showed that present pleasures are valued more than future pleasures by the 
individual, but then she chooses future pleasures because self-control processes 
intervene favoring larger gains in the long run.  
The prudent agent does not sacrifice her future well-being for present desires and 
thus she less steeply discounts it. Hence, the updated concept of prudence includes the 
care of oneself constrained not only by the consideration of the effects of one’s action 
on other people, but also by the consideration of the effects on one’s own future self. 
Preliminary evidence indicates that the two constraints of prudence are based on the 
same neural mechanism. By means of an affective forecasting task, Mitchell et al. 
(2011) [53] showed weaker activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) in 
subjects thinking about their future selves, compared to the condition in which they 
predicted how much they would have enjoyed present events. In addition, the greater 
the present > future difference in VMPFC, the less patient the subjects were in two 
intertemporal choice tasks. VMPFC was also less activated when participants 
predicted another individual’s enjoyment of present and future activities than their 
own enjoyment in a present activity. More precisely, VMPFC response was nearly 
identical when people envisioned their future enjoyment and another person’s present 
enjoyment. Albrecht et al. (2010) [54] found a similar result in the anterior MPFC 
(aMPFC), a region adjacent to VMPFC. In this study, aMPFC activity was very 
similar when subjects chose for themselves in an intertemporal choice task with two 
delayed alternatives and when they chose for a stranger in trials with one present 
alternative. These studies lead to the conclusion that VMPFC and aMPFC encode 
other people and the self in the future in the same way, most likely by representing the 
subjective state associated with a simulated experience.  
The data from Mitchell et al. (2011) and Albrecht et al. (2010) could be interpreted 
in the light of the Smithian concepts of adoption of other people perspective and 
sympathy: the individual that discounts the future more steeply fails in two processes 
of perspective-taking. Firstly, she does not see herself from a third party perspective; 
consequently, she does not relativize her present needs. Secondly, she does not 
identify herself with her future self, therefore, she does not feel her future self’s 
needs. At the same time, Smith’s prudence can be integrated by Mitchell et al. (2011): 
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if the individual perceives her future self as someone else, she will take care of her 
future self less than her present self because she conceives herself in the future as a 
stranger; thus she is not as concerned for her future self as she is concerned for her 
present self.  
A recent study confirmed the role of perspective taking in intertemporal choices in 
another brain region: the posterior temporoparietal junction (TPJ). TPJ is implicated 
in overcoming one’s one viewpoint. Its temporary disruption with transcranial 
magnetic stimulation resulted in a strong reduction of the value of the delayed reward 
and thus in impatient choices [55]. 
 
3.4. Risk and loss aversion 
Hazard aversion typical of Smithian prudence is an aversion to the factors that put 
the agent’s economic and social status at risk. It is very similar to risk aversion, which 
is a classical subject of behavioral economics [56] and neuroscience (see for instance 
[57-62]; for a review, see [63]). Risk aversion is an attitude towards risk that consists 
in the preference of a sure payment to a gamble with an equal or higher expected 
value.4 Attitude towards risk is subjective and influences the value that an individual 
attributes to a risky option in decision-making: the more an agent is risk-averse, the 
more the utility of a gamble is reduced by the risk of the options. The Expected Utility 
Theory, which models risky choices by decomposing them into the utility of possible 
outcomes and their probability, accounts for risk attitude by converting the outcomes 
into their utility and weighting this utility with an index of risk attitude [64-65]. 
Prospect Theory, namely the descriptive theory of choice elaborated by Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, multiplies the value of each outcome with a decision 
weight that represents the impact of the outcome probability on the subject [66-67]. 
The weighting function of Prospect Theory, along with its value function, better 
accounts for the individual’s behavior exposed to risk than Expected Utility Theory.. 
As seen, according to Smith, the origin of hazard aversion is due to human 
constitution that renders pain a more pungent sensation than the opposite and 
corresponding pleasure. In behavioral economics, this phenomenon is called loss 
aversion and consists in the individual’s avoidance of choices that can lead to losses. 
It reflects the degree to which people are more sensitive to decreases in their wealth 
                                                      
4  The expected value is equal to the sum of all possible outcomes weighted by their respective 
probability and it is not influenced by subjective attitudes toward risk. 
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than to increases of the same objective magnitude. Loss aversion is one of the main 
psychological phenomena included in Prospect Theory. Similarly to Smith’s 
statement that individuals are more sensitive to pain than to pleasure, Prospect Theory 
states that they weight losses about twice as powerfully as gains [66-67].  
Smith states that the agent avoids risky choices with the alternative of a loss, on the 
one hand, and the alternative of a gain, because she prevents the possibility of 
experiencing the pain of a loss. Prospect Theory gives the same account of people’s 
risk aversion in mixed gambles. They are gambles that offer an equal probability of a 
gain or loss and thus depict a choice set similar to that discussed by Smith, even 
though he does not specify the probability of the alternatives. In mixed gambles, 
Prospect Theory contends that the individual’s risk aversion is caused by loss 
aversion: since losses loom larger than gains, people usually reject gambles with a 
50/50 chance of either losing $ 100 or gaining $ 100; they accept the gamble only if 
the potential gain is about twice the amount of the potential loss. 
 
In summary, the correspondences between the components of prudence and several 
neurobiological and behavioral phenomena are the following: the adoption of another 
person’s perspective described by Smith parallels OPT in the form of imagine-other 
perspective; Smith’s view of high and medium self-command is very close to the 
strategy of emotion regulation called distancing; Smith’s account of patience and 
long-sightedness corresponds to low time discounting; Smith’s depiction of hazard 
aversion is similar to risk aversion; lastly, the asymmetrical perception of pain and 
pleasure in Smith’s system anticipates the behavioral phenomenon of loss aversion. 
 
4. The updated definition of Smithian prudence and its normative and 
descriptive elements  
 On the basis of the similarities between Smith’s components of prudence and the 
cognitive processes that I have described, an updated definition of Smithian prudence 
can be outlined, which stands at the intersection between moral philosophy, 
economics, and neuroscience. The updated concept of Smithian prudence is the 
attitude of choosing in view of one’s present and future well-being, taking into 
account other people (in the sense of not using them as means) and opting for the 
alternative with a low probability of loss. Similarly to − but more in general than − 
the Smithian definition of prudence, in the updated notion, the objects of prudence are 
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what contributes to the individual’s well-being, and the aim of prudence remains the 
betterment of one’s own economic and moral conditions. In this updated version, 
Smithian prudence is interpreted as a style or approach of decision-making defined 
Smithianly prudent and comprising OPT, distancing, low time discounting as well as 
risk and loss aversion. 
The updated version of prudence contains both descriptive and normative elements 
of human behavior. With regards to the descriptive components, from a biological and 
evolutionary perspective, the objects of the updated prudence – which are the factors 
that contribute to the individual’s well-being − are something that the individual 
naturally seeks, since they derive from the tendency of living creatures to preserve 
themselves [68: 12-13]. Even the aversions to risk and loss are natural dispositions of 
human beings in mixed gambles. [66-67, 69]. Individuals, though, can exercise 
control upon risk and loss aversion and thus enhance or diminish them through 
various strategies, in order to take the optimal decision. The latter depends on the 
characteristics of the choice set, such as the magnitude of the outcome, its probability, 
the time of the outcome delivery, and the information available to the individual. One 
of the main strategies to influence risk and loss aversion is recognizing and 
manipulating the heuristic procedures that an individual deploys to simplify the 
representation and evaluation of a choice set, which is thus mentally transformed or 
edited by her [66]. The modification of the description of the choice alternatives, 
namely the frame in which they are presented [70-71], can condition aversion to risk 
and loss as well. Considering the aim of the UTSP – i.e. giving a single interpretation 
of the cognitive processes corresponding to the components of prudence –, the most 
interesting strategy to reduce loss and risk aversion is the adoption of a third party’s 
perspective when taking a risky decision [72]. In fact, since this strategy is a form of 
distancing aimed at down-regulating the negative emotions triggered by the prospect 
of losing something, it points out the close connection amongst OPT, distancing, and 
loss and risk aversion. 
The normative side of the updated Smithian prudence comprises what the 
individual forces herself to do, namely, the two constraints that she imposes on the 
care of herself: not using others when pursuing one’s own purposes and not 
sacrificing her future well-being for the present well-being, namely being a low time 
discounter. OPT is a mechanism enabling the agent to apply these constraints to the 
care of oneself. 
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Hence, the Smithianly prudent style of decision-making has a mixed nature. On the 
one hand, the pursuit of well-being along with loss and risk aversion are descriptive 
traits of human behavior, even though loss and risk aversion can be regulated by the 
agent. On the other hand, the constraints involved in the care of the self represent the 
normative elements of which the updated prudence demands adoption. 
 
5. The updated theory of Smithian prudence (UTSP) 
In the updated definition of Smithian prudence, OPT, distancing, low time 
discounting, as well as loss and risk aversion are linked to each other according to 
specific relations. In other words, the updated definition of Smithian prudence 
suggests a unitary interpretation of these cognitive processes. This interpretation is the 
UTSP, which is a descriptive theory in the sense of a framework interpreting and 
connecting different elements of decision-making that neuroscience and behavioral 
economics have studied but only partially connected so far.  
The general criterion that guides the elaboration of the UTSP is to provide a 
consistent and empirically sound account of the Smithianly prudent style of decision-
making. Because of the similarity between the components of prudence and some 
cognitive processes of decision-making, the UTSP is based on Smith’s intuitions on 
several human behavioral patterns that seem to find a correspondence in 
neuroscientific and behavioral findings. Hence, the UTSP is the result, on the one 
hand, of the observational-experimental method used to investigate the cognitive 
processes of the Smithianly prudent behavior; on the other hand, it is the result of the 
conceptual-logical method that has been used to organize and connect the cognitive 
processes corresponding to the components of Smithian prudence. 
The first pillar of the UTSP is self-projection, which is the ability to shift from the 
current situation to alternative perspectives. In fact, firstly, the demand of not using 
others is respected through OPT in the form of imagine-other perspective. The 
adoption of an impartial person’s stance needs further ability of imagination in order 
to identify oneself with an individual with such characteristic. Secondly, since 
distancing is a strategy of emotion regulation that is founded on taking other people’s 
perspective, even distancing has a fundamental resource in the ability to simulate 
alternative perspectives. Thirdly, OPT is also an essential strategy in intertemporal 
choices, because the ability to take the future self’s perspective results in less steep 
temporal discounting [3-8]. The ability to imagine detailed future experiences by 
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adopting the future self’s point of view is called episodic future thinking [73].5 Hence, 
in the UTSP, the principle that unifies OPT, distancing, and low temporal discounting 
is the shift of perspective in space and time: from the individual to others and from 
the present self to the future self. Evidence supporting the connection of OPT, 
distancing and low temporal discounting under the cognitive process of self-
projection comes from Buckner and Carroll (2007) [10]. The authors proposed that 
self-projection is the underlying process common to a set of cognitive functions: 
navigation or topographic orientation, autobiographical memory, episodic future 
thinking, and ToM, which is a component of OPT. The brain network supporting 
these different forms of self-projection includes frontal, prefrontal and frontopolar 
regions, medial and lateral parietal lobe regions as well as the medial temporal pole. 
Buckner and Carroll’s self-projection system is based on the observations that (i) the 
areas involved in navigation, prospection, autobiographical memory, and ToM 
overlap; (ii) the abilities of navigation, prospection, autobiographical memory, and 
ToM emerge together at about the age of four; and (iii) patients with deficit in 
autobiographical memory are impaired in conceiving the personal future and in self-
referential processes. 
Hassabis and Maguire (2009) [74] identified a similar brain network responsible 
for the simulation of experience, although they characterized this network as the 
neural substrate not of projecting the self in different contexts, but rather of 
constructing scenes through the reactivation, retrieval, and integration of semantic, 
contextual and sensory components. They conceived the scene-construction system as 
the network active when attention is directed away from the current external status 
and focused towards an internal representation of an event. ToM is excluded from the 
system because it is not considered essential to the construction of a scene.  
The systems of Hassabis and Maguire (2009) and Buckner and Carroll (2007) are 
not incompatible. Although further evidence is needed to understand precisely how 
scenes and perspectives emerge from brain activity, the scene-construction network 
could be considered the basis of the self-projection network, with which the UTSP 
shares the ability to shift to alternative perspectives, in the future or into other people. 
Moreover, using the activation likelihood estimation approach, Spreng et al. (2009) 
                                                      
5 In the case of the relation between episodic future thinking and OPT, it is not specified if the former 
depends either on imagine-self perspective or on imagine-other perspective because this distinction is 
less significant when the self and the other, i.e. the future self, coincides, as is in this case. 
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[75] presented a quantitative and systematic demonstration of the common neural 
network of mentally projecting oneself from the present moment into a simulation of 
another time, place, and perspective. In this study, the neural underpinnings of 
autobiographical memory, episodic future thinking, and ToM, but not navigation, 
displayed the highest degree of overlap. This suggests that self-related processes are 
the common element that ToM, autobiographical memory, and episodic future 
thinking share, as navigation does not necessarily need the recollection of 
autobiographical information. In addition, using multivariate analysis, Spreng and 
Grady (2010) [76] found a common pattern of activation underlying autobiographical 
memory, episodic future thinking, and ToM within the same subjects. Finally, 
O’Connell et al. (2015) [9] developed a theoretical framework of intertemporal 
choices that connects OPT with episodic future thinking. The authors proposed that 
intertemporal choices are grounded in the ability to imagine how the other – who is 
the future self in such choices – feels.  
In the self-projection mechanism, OPT, distancing, and low time discounting share 
the advantage that the simulation of an experience represents an enrichment of the 
relevant elements of a decisional context. Clearly, the additional information is not 
objective, because it comes from a simulation, hence it is made of the individual’s 
past experiences. The effective utility of the simulated experience in helping the agent 
to make a decision stands in her ability to recognize a situation as similar to a familiar 
class and thus to retrieve the information that is suitable to the current situation. 
Therefore, simulated experiences need the capacity to generalize from observed cases 
and draw analogies from the familiar to the unfamiliar.6 On the basis of the agent’s 
ability of self-projection, the UTSP explains why OPT is proportional to social 
distance and low time discounting is subject to temporal distance. When the 
individual has to simulate an experience that is very different from her past 
experience, as it is the case of OPT with strangers or with the self in a distant future, 
the mechanism of simulation can only sketch a vicarious experience and this makes 
the identification more difficult for the individual. 
The second pillar of the UTSP is loss aversion. On the basis of Smith’s account of 
hazard aversion and its origin, which is very close to that provided by Prospect 
                                                      
6 This capacity is called case-based reasoning. It is a form of reasoning in which new problems in 
complex situations and with imperfect information are solved by retrieving relevant similar cases from 
memory, establishing correspondences between these cases and the new problems, and adapting the 
prior solutions to fit the new problems [77-78]. 
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Theory, the UTSP states that loss aversion causes risk aversion because the agent’s 
aversion to risk consists in the fear of losing what the individual already possesses or 
could possess. The mere possibility of losing something is enough to make the 
individual refrain from risky choices, as losses loom larger than gains.  
Concerning the relation between the two pillars of the UTSP, the latter reads loss 
aversion as a simulation of the effective negative experience of losing something. The 
neural areas processing negative states, such as the insula, are active during the 
perception of a noxious stimulus, but also in the anticipation of losses with a 
prospective aversive signal [69, 79-80]. The anticipation of losses can be interpreted 
as a form of unconscious and automatic simulation because both processes trigger the 
same bodily and affective reactions in absence of the factor that usually causes these 
reactions, i.e. the effective loss. However, the simulation of a loss can be also 
deliberate and conscious, if the individual chooses to adopt the perspective of herself 
after losing something or the perspective of another person that has lost something.  
In conclusion, the UTSP is founded on the ability to consciously or unconsciously 
simulate subjective experiences. This ability gathers together OPT, distancing, and 
low temporal discounting – which are forms of self-projection – as well as loss 
aversion and consequently risk aversion (Fig. 1). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Proposed scheme of the elements characterizing the updated Smithian prudence that are 
connected in the UTSP. One of the main strategies of low-temporal discounting is episodic future 
thinking, whereas distancing and the prohibition of using others as means are implemented through the 
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adoption of the imagine-other perspective. Both episodic future thinking and imagine-other perspective 
are part of the self-projection ability, which is the first pillar of the UTSP and consists in a conscious 
simulation of an alternative perspective. Risk aversion is caused by loss aversion, which is the second 
pillar of the UTSP and derives from a conscious or unconscious simulation of a loss 
 
 
6. The normative updated theory of Smithian prudence (NUTSP) 
The UTSP is a descriptive theory, but since it is founded on a concept that is partly 
normative, the NUTSP can be outlined on the basis of the UTSP. This normative 
theory demands two prescriptions: to not treat others as means and to consider one’s 
own well-being in the long run. It suggests respecting these requirements by 
respectively adopting the perspective of others and that of one’s own future self. 
The NUTSP is a piece of a normative moral theory and answers to Socrates’s 
question: “How should I live?” in contexts in which the agent aiming at economic and 
moral betterment faces a decision transversal to the moral and economic spheres. In 
these situations, the individual’s well-being is at stake and other people can be 
affected by her decision and subsequent action. There are many, and often 
contrasting, definitions of well-being [81]. The aim of the NUTSP is not to specify 
what well-being is in detail, but rather to indicate how to pursue it. The normative 
moral theory of which the NUTSP is a piece should provide a definition of well-
being. If the agent wants to better her moral and economic conditions, the NUTSP is a 
guiding principle to attain them; it is a sort of Kantian hypothetical imperative ([23] 
II: 24-26).  
 
6.1 The normative justification of the NUTSP 
The NUTSP prescribes, when pursuing one’s own well-being, to not use others as 
means and to consider one’s own future well-being. These two demands would better 
one’s own moral and economic conditions, respectively. 
Although the NUTSP is founded on the UTSP, the justification of the former 
cannot be derived from the observations of neuroscience and behavioral economics, 
because this would be a violation of Hume’s Law7 and a naturalistic fallacy.8 Since 
the NUTSP is a hypothetical imperative, one way to justify it is to prove that this 
                                                      
7 Hume’s law states the impossibility of deriving or deducing a prescriptive statement only from 
assertions that describe how the world is configured ([82], III.i.1: 469-470). 
8 It is the mistake of identifying that which is natural with that which is good or right ([83], ch. 1, sect. 
10: 9-10).  
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theory enables the individual who is interested in pursuing well-being and betterment 
of her own condition to effectively achieve them. Proving this efficacy would render 
the NUTSP a valuable resource for moral philosophy. There is currently some 
preliminary indirect evidence of the effectiveness of the NUTSP.  
With regard to the prescription of considering one’s own future well-being, which 
is also suitable for a normative economic theory, the steep discounting of one’s own 
future utilities produces myopic decisions. These are a type of sub-optimal decision, 
in which the agent maximizes immediate rewards and consigns her future self to pay 
the costs of her present behavior. This conduct is common in several spheres of 
decision-making, such as saving for retirement, dieting, and staying healthy [84-87].9 
The demand of the normative updated theory of prudence would reduce the burdens 
that one’s future self has to pay and thus it would contribute to the goal of bettering 
one’s own economic condition. The proof that this request of the NUTSP is effective 
in bettering one’s own economic condition comes from the studies on self-control, a 
key prerequisite for patience and gratification delay. Moffitt et al. (2011) [89] showed 
that self-control in childhood predicts good socio-economic position and income 
earned in adulthood, even when accounting for social class origin and intelligence 
quotient. Romal and Kaplan (1995) [90] found that people with high self-control, 
measured with Rosenbaum’s Self-Control Schedule, were better able to save money 
than people with lower levels of self-control. Yet so far no studies have investigated 
the influence of a stable low-discounting trait on the agent’s economic condition, 
controlling for other predictors of socioeconomic status. 
According to the link between low temporal discounting and OPT suggested by the 
UTSP, the adoption of the future self’s perspective would be further effective in 
discounting future outcomes less steeply. There are several studies that have proved 
that episodic future thinking attenuates the individual’s discounting rate (see, for 
instance [3-8]). However, although the definition of episodic future thinking requires 
a first person perspective (i.e. seeing a future event from one’s own future 
perspective) [73], these studies did not instruct the subjects to exclusively adopt the 
first person point of view, which corresponds to the OPT applied to the future self. 
Hence, they did not rule out the adoption of the third-person perspective (i.e. seeing 
                                                      
9 In general, in these spheres, choosing the delayed option is usually the optimal decision. However, in 
contexts in which the delivery of the delayed reward is highly uncertain and/or there is an important 
opportunity cost associated, choosing the immediate reward is more adaptive or rational [88]. 
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one’s own future self that experiences a future event) [91]. The effects on time 
discounting of the perspective adopted when thinking about one’s own future and the 
improvement of intertemporal choices through episodic future thinking are intriguing 
topics for future research.  
In the matter of prohibiting treating others as means, OPT in the form of imagine-
other perspective indicates to the individual the actions that in a given context respect 
this norm. This means that by imagining being the other, the agent better 
acknowledges which possible action that she is going to perform as an agent results in 
exploitation of the other. The role of OPT is not prescribing norms, but rather 
identifying the actions that respect the norm given by the NUTSP and thus making 
possible the undertaking of them. Proving empirically that the adoption of other 
people’s perspective is effective in bettering one’s own moral conditions is not easy. 
The difficulty is due to the fact that there is no agreement on what can be considered a 
betterment of moral condition and how it can be measured. Yet two considerations 
can be forwarded. Firstly, in neuroscientific studies, the adoption of an imagine-other 
perspective elicits empathic concern, which is a fundamental constituent of prosocial 
behavior [29, 92-93]. There is no univocal definition of prosocial behavior, and 
depending on the definition of prosocial behavior its moral evaluation changes [94: 
note 9: 196-197, 200-201]. In general, however, an act beneficial to other people is 
considered prosocial [95]. I consider not treating others as means a foundation of 
prosocial behavior, since it is a form of taking others into account. The link between 
the adoption of an imagine-other perspective and prosocial behavior does not mean 
that OPT gives a motivation to implement a prosocial action to every agent. Yet in the 
case of the NUTSP, the addressees are individuals who are already motivated to better 
their moral conditions and thus follow the requirements of the NUTSP to achieve this 
aim; indeed, the NUTSP is a hypothetical imperative10. 
                                                      
10 For this reason, psychopaths, who are impaired in emotional empathy but not in cognitive empathy 
[96-97], are a priori excluded from the requirements of the NUTSP, as they do not aim at being moral 
and a fortiori at attaining moral development. In other words, although they can be Smithianly prudent 
because they have no deficit in the ability of OPT, they are not interested in being as such. In healthy 
subjects, OPT can result in antisocial behavior in highly competitive contexts, in which OPT is used to 
exploit others and reach one’s own aims [98], but this is not the case of prudent behavior by definition. 
In addition, it is true that adopting the perspective of others can result in an aversive rather than 
prosocial response, such as withdrawal. However, in healthy subjects, this happens when the agent 
imagines herself being in the other person’s situation [29, 92-93], not when she imagines being the 
other person, which is the case of imagine-other perspective that is used by the prudent agent. 
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The relation between emotional empathy and morality is complex. Indeed, if OPT 
results in empathizing too much with a person and exploiting others in order to help 
her, this act is not moral. However, as the NUTSP requires not using others as means, 
too much emotional empathy cannot result in the exploitation of someone in favor of 
another person. In addition, Decety and Cowell (2014) [99] showed that while 
emotional empathy can at times be a source of immoral actions, OPT is less subject to 
the bias of partiality. Moreover, since in the imagine-other perspective the individual 
focuses on the other’s feelings and needs, this shift of perspective helps the agent to 
step back from the focus on herself and her needs, and to be more impartial. 
Therefore, so far there is evidence that the prohibition of treating others as means 
through the adoption of their or an impartial spectator’s perspective produces two 
effects: the exercise of the individual’s impartiality and empathic concern, which can 
be considered fundamental components of the agent’s moral development [100].  
Hence, the first reason why the NUTSP is useful for moral philosophy is that it is a 
piece of normative theory that proved to be effective in guiding the prudent agent, 
according to preliminary evidence. To corroborate this evidence – and also to provide 
the UTSP with a sounder basis –, this article suggests directions for future research, as 
shown in section 7. 
 
6.2 The feasibility of the NUTSP 
Neuroscience and behavioral economics are not normative disciplines. However, 
their contribution to a normative theory such as the NUTSP – and thus to moral 
philosophy − is fundamental because the description of how agents behave and 
choose sheds more light on how these agents are [101]. The aim of Smith’s lifelong 
study goes in a direction similar to that of neuroscience and behavioral economics: 
developing a science of man founded on the observation of human nature [15: 26-27, 
289, 519; 102].  
In addition, neuroscience can identify those demands coming from the normative 
level that cannot be fulfilled since they are not compatible with the agent’s nature, 
namely they are completely different and extraneous to the way humans make 
decisions. The addressees of morality are human beings, hence a norm valid for them 
should take into consideration how they are. The point of contact between the 
descriptive level of reality and the normative level of reality stands in the conditions 
of feasibility of morality, in the sense that neuroscience can criticize normative 
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theories in the aspects in which these theories do not fit with experience at all, with 
the result that the individual would assume their norms only by alienating herself 
from her nature. The morally alienating theories that are not feasible can be defined 
lost or unnatural moral theories [103]. Determining the exact criterion with which to 
judge the natural or biological feasibility of a moral theory would take this topic too 
far afield, but the core of this criterion is to verify whether such a theory brings about 
the alienation of agent from herself. This alienation is the giving up of something that 
is an essential element of the way in which the agent takes a decision.  
The confirmation of Smith’s components of prudence by neuroscience 
demonstrates that the NUTSP is biologically feasible and does not cause alienation in 
the individual that follows this theory. In fact, neuroscientific studies show that the 
normative elements of prudence, namely low temporal discounting and the 
consideration of others in the form of not using them as means, are perfectly 
compatible with our brain functioning, since agents are observed adopting these 
normative elements, albeit with individual variability. This adoption occurs with 
different degrees of effort that are influenced by external circumstances. In fact, in the 
case of low temporal discounting, the more the future self is distant from the present 
self, the greater the effort is for the agent to be patient. In the case of the prohibition 
of using others as means, the more the agent is distant (physically and/or socially) 
from the person with whom she exchanges places, the greater the effort is for the 
agent to imagine being the other person.  
A normative theory that is biologically feasible contributes to Nagel’s and 
Williams’s project of reducing the conflict between the agent’s moral life and her 
good life [104: ch. 1; 105: ch. 10]. In their view, a moral life, i.e. an existence 
respecting the requisites of a moral theory, can threaten a desirable life because of 
some impersonal requisites. A desirable life is an existence that is considered good by 
the individual who is living it; this life comprises moral life but it is more complex. 
The NUTSP is valuable for moral philosophy for a second reason: it is not morally 
alienating – and thus too demanding – for the agent that wants to live a moral and 
good life at once. 
It could be objected that a high effort to adopt prudent behavior when taking care 
of strangers and of the distant future self is similar to the alienation of the unnatural or 
lost moral theories. However, although the care of strangers and of the distant future 
self is more difficult to undertake than other prudent acts, it does not cause the 
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individual’s loss of one or more essential elements of her way of making decisions. 
The care of strangers and of the future self is compatible with our brain functioning in 
decision-making. Moreover, if we drew the conclusion that taking care of strangers 
and of the future self is wrong or weakly prescriptive from the fact that this behavior 
is difficult, we would infringe Hume’s Law.  
A second objection that may arise is the observation that a normative theory 
receiving empirical confirmation of its feasibility has no extra value because the 
influences of social and temporal distance on the adoption of an alternative 
perspective are truisms. However, neuroscience and also behavioral economics 
provide the empirical confirmation of ideas that, albeit commonplace and seemingly 
plausible, without factual discoveries would remain mere falsifiable intuitions [106: 
407]. 
 
7. The limitations of the UTSP and NUTSP and future research on these 
theories 
So far the UTSP is based on Buckner and Carroll’s self-projection system, 
O’Connell et al. (2015)’s theoretical framework of intertemporal choices, and on 
evidence provided by Spreng et al. (2008) and Spreng and Grady (2010). However, in 
the self-projection system, the mutual influences of ToM, on the one hand, and 
episodic future thinking and episodic memory, on the other, do not find complete 
consensus [74, 108-109]. According to the self-projection system, ToM, 
autobiographical memory, and episodic future thinking derive from the same ability. 
Consequently, future investigation should assess whether impairments in OPT 
accompany a deficit both in distancing and in intertemporal choice tasks with cues 
prompting individuals to imagine personal future events. This prediction is not easy to 
verify because, firstly, patients that have lost the ability to recollect personal 
happenings are rare. Secondly, ToM is a complex ability consisting of different 
processes; hence, if the ability to shift into another person’s perspective is limited 
because the individual is no longer able to recollect personal memories, she may 
compensate for this deficit with semantic memory or other general knowledge 
abilities that she has acquired before the injury [110-111]. Therefore, future research 
on the co-occurrence of deficits in autobiographical memory, ToM, temporal 
discounting and distancing needs to control for the different components of ToM.  
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Concerning the limitations of the NUTSP, currently its effectiveness is based on 
indirect evidence of its ability to better the agent’s moral and economic conditions. 
With regards to the prescription of considering one’s own well-being in the long run, 
a study that directly investigates if low discounters are better-off than the average 
would further prove the effectiveness of the NUTSP. With regards to the prescription 
of not using others as means by using the imagine-other perspective, a study that 
directly examines the correlation between the imagine-other perspective and moral 
development would be very useful in testing the effectiveness of the NUTSP. Another 
possible way of evaluating the effectiveness of the NUTSP is to compare it with the 
ability of other normative decision-making theories to better the individual’s moral 
and economic conditions. However, in order to test the ability of a prescription to 
better one’s moral condition, a clear and measurable definition of moral development 
on which there is some agreement is needed. 
 
Conclusion  
In this article, I have outlined an updated theory of prudence, the UTSP, which is 
inspired by Smith’s prudence and is in line with the neuroscientific findings on OPT, 
distancing, temporal discounting as well as risk and loss aversion.  
The UTSP is an important resource for neuroscience because it embraces the 
cognitive processes corresponding to Smithian prudence within a single framework 
that points out their mutual influences. In this theory, prudence is conceived as a 
Smithianly prudent style of decision-making, which consists in the attitude of 
choosing in view of one’s present and future well-being, taking into account other 
people and opting for the safest alternative. The UTSP is useful not only for 
neuroscience, but also for moral philosophy because, since it embraces and connects 
several human traits that are involved in decision-making, it sheds light on the 
addressees of moral theories. 
The UTSP is the basis of a normative theory, the NUTSP, that is a valuable 
resource for moral philosophy for two reasons. Firstly, this normative theory is 
effective in leading the individual to better her economic and moral conditions, 
according to indirect preliminary evidence. Secondly, as the NUTSP is based on an 
empirically sound account, it has the advantage of avoiding a source of alienation for 
the agent that wants to live a moral and good life at once.  
 27 
Although Smith’s thought has been extensively dealt with both in moral 
philosophy and economics, its potentialities have not yet been fully realized and 
neuroscientific research has expanded their reach. Prudence is one of Smith’s ideas 
the potential of which has not yet been recognized and exploited. The present article 
is an attempt to develop this idea by making it interact with neuroscience and 
behavioral economics, which share with Smith two investigative aims: human actions 
and decisions. The potential of Smith’s concept of prudence that emerges from the 
interaction is the marked impact of this concept in the study of human decision-
making. Accordingly, the descriptive and normative updated theories that I have 
derived from Smithian prudence should be taken into account by the disciplines 
dealing with human decision-making, whether investigating how individuals make 
decisions or how they ought to make decisions. 
  
 28 
Bibliography  
[1] Sokol-Hessner, Peter, Colin F. Camerer, and Elisabeth A. Phelps, 2012. Emotion 
regulation reduces loss aversion and decreases amygdala responses to losses. Social 
Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 8(3): 341–350. 
[2] Ochsner, Kevin N., Rebecca D. Ray, Jeffrey C. Cooper, Elaine R. Robertson, Sita 
Chopra, John D. E. Gabrieli, and James J. Gross. 2004. For better or for worse: Neural 
systems supporting the cognitive down- and up-regulation of negative emotion. 
NeuroImage 23(2): 483–499. 
[3] Benoit, Roland G., Sam J. Gilbert, and Paul W. Burgess. 2011. A neural mechanism 
mediating the impact of episodic prospection on farsighted decisions. The Journal of 
Neuroscience 31(18): 6771–6779.  
[4] Peters, Jan, and Christian Büchel. 2010. Episodic Future Thinking Reduces Reward 
Delay Discounting through an Enhancement of Prefrontal-Mediotemporal Interactions. 
Neuron 66(1): 138–148. 
[5] Daniel, Tinuke O., Christina M. Stanton, and Leonard H. Epstein. 2013. The future is 
now: comparing the effect of episodic future thinking on impulsivity in lean and obese 
individuals. Appetite 71: 120–125. 
[6] Daniel, Tinuke O., Christina M. Stanton, and Leonard H. Epstein. 2013. The future is 
now: reducing impulsivity and energy intake using episodic future thinking. 
Psychological Science, 24(11): 2339–2342.  
[7] Daniel, Tinuke O., Michele Said, Christina M. Stanton, and Leonard H. Epstein. 2015. 
Episodic future thinking reduces delay discounting and energy intake in children. Eating 
Behaviors, 18: 20–24.  
[8] Dassen, Fania C. M., Anita Jansen, Chantal Nederkoorn, and Katrijn Houben. 2016. 
Focus on the future: Episodic future thinking reduces discount rate and snacking. 
Appetite, 96: 327–332.  
[9] O’Connell, Garret, Anastasia Christakou, and Bhismadev Chakrabarti. 2015. The role of 
simulation in intertemporal choices. Frontiers in Neuroscience, 9(94): 1–10. 
[10] Buckner, Randy L., and Daniel C. Carroll. 2007. Self-projection and the brain. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(2): 49–57 
[11] Rilling, James K., and Alan G. Sanfey. 2011. The Neuroscience of Social Decision-
Making. Annual Review of Psychology, 62: 23–48.  
[12] Farah, Martha J. 2005. Neuroethics: The practical and the philosophical. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences 9(1): 34–40.  
[13] Ramanathan, Suresh, and Geeta Menon. 2006. Time-Varying Effects of Chronic 
Hedonic Goals on Impulsive Behavior. Journal of Marketing Research, 43(4): 628–641.  
[14] Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales. 2013. Time Varying Risk 
Aversion. NBER Working Paper No. 19284: 1–52.  
[15] Phillipson, Nicholas. 2010. Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life. Allen Lane: London. 
[16] Montes, Leonidas. 2004. Adam Smith in Context: A Critical Reassessment of Some 
Central Components of His Thought. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
[17] Cremaschi, Sergio. 1984. Il sistema della ricchezza. Economia politica e problema 
del metodo in Adam Smith. Milano: Franco Angeli. 
[18] Force, Pierre. 2003. Self-Interest before Adam Smith: A Genealogy of Economic 
Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
[19] Smith, Adam. 1976a [1759-1790]. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. In The Glasgow 
Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, eds. David D. Raphael and 
Alec L. Macfie, vol. I. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
[20] Vivenza, Gloria. 2001. Adam Smith and the Classics: The Classical Heritage in 
Adam Smith’s Thought. New York: Oxford University Press. 
[21] Smith, Adam. 1976b [1776-1789]. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations. In The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam 
Smith, eds. Roy H. Campbell and Andrew S. Skinner, vol. II. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
[22] Forman-Barzilai, Fonna. 2010. Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy: 
 29 
Cosmopolitanism and Moral Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
[23] Kant, Immanuel. 2006 [1785]. The Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Mary J. Gregor. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
[24] Viganò, Eleonora. 2017. Not Just an Inferior Virtue, nor Self-Interest: Adam Smith 
on Prudence. Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 15(1): 125–143. 
[25] Shamay-Tsoory, Simone G. 2011. The neural bases for empathy. The Neuroscientist, 
17(1): 18–24.  
[26] Singer, Tania, and Anita Tusche. 2014. Understanding Others: Brain Mechanisms of 
Theory of Mind and Empathy. In Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain: 
Second Edition, eds. Paul W. Glimcher and Ernst Fehr. London: Academic Press.  
[27] Singer, Tania, and Claus Lamm. 2009. The social neuroscience of empathy. Annals of 
the New York Academy of Sciences 1156: 81–96.  
[28] Lamm, Claus, Howard Nusbaum, Andrew N. Meltzoff, and Jean Decety. 2007a. 
What are you feeling? Using functional magnetic resonance imaging to assess the 
modulation of sensory and affective responses during empathy for pain. PLoS One 2(12): 
e1292. 
[29] Lamm, Claus, C. Daniel Batson, and Jean Decety. 2007b. The neural substrate of 
human empathy: effects of perspective-taking and cognitive appraisal. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience 19(1): 42–58.  
[30] Cheng, Yawei, Ching-Po Lin, Ho-Ling Liu, Yuan-Yu Hsu, Kun-Eng Lim, Daisy 
Hung, and Jean Decety. 2007. Expertise Modulates the Perception of Pain in Others. 
Current Biology 17(19): 1708–1713. 
[31] Decety, Jean, and Claus Lamm. 2006. Human empathy through the lens of social 
neuroscience. The Scientific World Journal, 6: 1146–1163. 
[32] Coplan, Amy. 2011. Understanding Empathy: Its Features and Effects. In Empathy: 
Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, eds. Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
[33] Batson, C. Daniel. 2009. Two forms of perspective taking: Imagining how another 
feels and imagining how you would feel. In Handbook of imagination and mental 
simulation, eds. Keith D. Markman, William M. P. Klein, and Julie A. Suhr. New York: 
Psychology Press. 
[34] Stotland, Ezra. 1969. Exploratory Investigations of Empathy. Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology, 4(C): 271–314.  
[35] Kiesling, L. Lynne 2012. Mirror neuron research and Adam Smith’s concept of 
sympathy: Three points of correspondence. The Review of Austrian Economics, 25(4): 
299–313. 
[36] Griswold, Charles L. Jr. 2006. Imagination: Morals, Science, and Arts. In, The 
Cambridge Companion to Adam Smith, ed. Knud Haakonssen. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
[37] Iacoboni, Marco. 2009. Imitation, Empathy, and Mirror Neurons. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 60(1): 653–670.  
[38] Rizzolatti, Giacomo, and Laila Craighero. 2004. The mirror-neuron system. Annual 
Review of Neuroscience, 27: 169–192.  
[39] Hutchison, William D., Karen D. Davis, Andres M. Lozano, R. R. Tasker, and 
Jonathan O. Dostrovsky. 1999. Pain-related neurons in the human cingulate cortex. 
Nature Neuroscience, 2(5): 403–405.  
[40] Mukamel, Roy, Ekstrom, Arne D., Kaplan, J., Marco Iacoboni, and Itzhak Fried. 
2010. Single-Neuron Responses in Humans during Execution and Observation of 
Actions. Current Biology, 20(8): 750–756.  
[41] Kaag, John. 2009. The neurological dynamics of the imagination. Phenomenology 
and the Cognitive Sciences, 8: 183–204. 
[42] Eisenberg, Nancy, Cynthia L. Smith, and Tracy L. Spinrad. 2011. Effortful Control: 
Relations with Emotion Regulation, Adjustment, and Socialization in Childhood. In 
Handbook of Self-Regulation, eds. Kathleen D. Vohs, and Roy F. Baumeister. New York-
London: The Guilford Press.  
 30 
[43] Ochsner, Kevin N., Jennifer A. Silvers, and Jason T. Buhle. 2012. Functional imaging 
studies of emotion regulation: a synthetic review and evolving model of the cognitive 
control of emotion. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1251: E1–24. 
[44] Ochsner, Kevin N., and James J. Gross. 2005. The cognitive control of emotion. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(5): 242–249.  
[45] Koenigsberg, Harold W., Jin Fan, Kevin N. Ochsner, Xun Liu, Kevin Guise, Scott 
Pizzarello, Christine Dorantes, Lucia Tecuta, Stephanie Guerreri, Marianne Goodman, 
Antonia New, Janine Flory, and Larry J. Siever. 2010. Neural correlates of using 
distancing to regulate emotional responses to social situations. Neuropsychologia, 48(6): 
1813–1822.  
[46] Ainslie, George, and Varda Haendel. 1983. The motives of the will. In Etiology 
Aspects of Alcohol and Drug Abuse, eds. Edward Gottheil, Keith Druley, Thomas E. 
Skoloda, and Howard M. Waxman. Springfield: Charles C. Thomas. 
[47] Laibson, David. 1997. Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 112(2): 443–477.  
[48] Frederick, Shane, George Loewenstein, and Ted O’Donoghue, 2002. Time 
Discounting and Preference : A Critical Review. Journal of Economic Literature, 40(2): 
351–401.  
[49] Green, Leonard, Joel Myerson, and Eric W. Macaux. 2005. Temporal discounting 
when the choice is between two delayed rewards. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 31(5): 1121–1133.  
[50] Soman, Dilip, George Ainslie, Shane Frederick, Xiuping Li, John Lynch, Page 
Moreau, Andrew Mitchell, Daniel Read, Alan Sawyer, Yaacov Trope, Klaus 
Wertenbroch, and Gal Zauberman. 2005. The psychology of intertemporal discounting: 
Why are distant events valued differently from proximal ones?. Marketing Letters, 16(3-
4): 347–360. 
[51] Kable, Joseph W. 2014. Valuation, Intertemporal Choice, and Self-Control. In 
Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain: Second Edition, eds. Paul W. 
Glimcher and Ernst Fehr. London: Academic Press. 
[52] Figner, Bernd, Daria Knoch, Eric J. Johnson, Amy R. Krosch, Sarah H. Lisanby, 
Ernst Fehr, and Elke U. Weber. 2010. Lateral prefrontal cortex and self-control in 
intertemporal choice. Nature Neuroscience, 13(5): 538–539.  
[53] Mitchell, Jason, Jessica Schirmer, Daniel L. Ames, and Daniel T. Gilbert. 2011. 
Medial prefrontal cortex predicts intertemporal choice. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 23(4): 857–866.  
[54] Albrecht, Konstanze, Kirsten G. Volz, Matthias Sutter, David I. Laibson, and D. Yves 
von Cramon. 2010. What is for me is not for you: brain correlates of intertemporal choice 
for self and other. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 6(2): 218–225. 
[55] Soutschek, Alexander, Christian C. Ruff, Tina Strombach, Tobias Kalenscher, and 
Philippe N. Tobler. 2016. Brain stimulation reveals crucial role of overcoming self-
centeredness in self-control. Science Advances, 2(10): e1600992. 
[56] Rabin, Matthew, and Richard H. Thaler, 2001. Anomalies: Risk Aversion. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 15(1): 219–232.  
[57] Christopoulos, George I., Philippe N. Tobler, Peter Bossaerts, Raymond J. Dolan, and 
Wolfram Schultz. 2009. Neural correlates of value, risk, and risk aversion contributing to 
decision making under risk. The Journal of Neuroscience, 29(40): 12574–12583. 
[58] Huettel, Scott A., C. Jill Stowe, Evan M. Gordon, Brent T. Warner, and Michael L. 
Platt. 2006. Neural signatures of economic preferences for risk and ambiguity. Neuron, 
49(5): 765–775.  
[59] Levy, Ifat, Jason Snell, Amy J. Nelson, Aldo Rustichini, and Paul W. Glimcher. 
2010. Neural representation of subjective value under risk and ambiguity. Journal of 
Neurophysiology, 103(2): 1036–1047.  
[60] Tobler, Philippe N., George I. Christopoulos, John P. O’Doherty, Raymond J. Dolan, 
and Wolfram Schultz. 2009. Risk-dependent reward value signal in human prefrontal 
 31 
cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 
106(17): 7185–7190.  
[61] Tobler, Philippe N., John P. O’Doherty, Raymond J. Dolan, and Wolfram Schultz. 
2007. Reward value coding distinct from risk attitude-related uncertainty coding in 
human reward systems. Journal of Neurophysiology, 97(2): 1621–1632.  
[62] Hsu, Ming, Meghana Bhatt, Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel, and Colin F. Camerer. 
2005. Neural systems responding to degrees of uncertainty in human decision-making. 
Science, 310(5754): 1680–1683.  
[63] Tobler, Philippe N., and Elke U. Weber. 2014. Valuation for Risky and Uncertain 
Choices. In Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain: Second Edition, eds. Paul 
W. Glimcher and Ernst Fehr. London: Academic Press. 
[64] Von Neumann, John, and Oskar Morgenstern. 1944. Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
[65] Bernoulli, Daniel. 1954 [1738]. Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of 
Risk. Econometrica, 22(1): 23–36.  
[66] Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1979. Prospect theory: An analysis of 
decision under risk. Econometrica, 4: 263–291. 
[67] Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1992. Advances in Prospect-Theory - 
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5(4): 297–
323.  
[68] Churchland, Patricia S. 2011. Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells us About 
Morality. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
[69] Canessa, Nicola, Chiara Crespi, Matteo Motterlini, Gabriel Baud-Bovy, Gabriele 
Chierchia, Giuseppe Pantaleo, Marco Tettamanti, and Stefano F. Cappa. 2013. The 
Functional and Structural Neural Basis of Individual Differences in Loss Aversion. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 33(36): 14307–14317.  
[70] Tversky, Amos, and Daniel Kahneman. 1981. The framing of decisions and the 
psychology of choice. Science, 211(4481): 453–458.  
[71] Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. 1984. Choices, values, and frames. American 
Psychologist, 39(4): 341–350. 
[72] Sokol-Hessner, Peter, Ming Hsu, Nina G. Curley, Mauricio R. Delgado, Colin F. 
Camerer, and Elizabeth A. Phelpsa. 2009. Thinking like a trader selectively reduces 
individuals’ loss aversion. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 106(13): 5035–5040. 
[73] Atance, Christina M., and Daniela K. O’Neill. 2001. Episodic future thinking. Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences, 5(12): 533–539. 
[74] Hassabis, Demis, and Eleanor A. Maguire, 2009. The construction system of the 
brain. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological 
Sciences, 364(1521): 1263–1271 
[75] Spreng, R. Nathan, Raymond A. Mar, and Alice S. N. Kim. 2009. The common 
neural basis of autobiographical memory, prospection, navigation, theory of mind, and 
the default mode: a quantitative meta-analysis. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21(3): 
489–510.  
[76] Spreng, R. Nathan, and Cheryl L. Grady. 2010. Patterns of Brain Activity Supporting 
Autobiographical Memory, Prospection, and Theory of Mind, and Their Relationship to 
the Default Mode Network. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22(6): 1112–1123. 
[77] Leake, David B. 1999. Case-based reasoning. In A Companion to Cognitive Science, 
eds. W. Bechtel and G. Graham. Oxford: Blackwell. 
[78] Churchland, Patricia S. 2009. Inference to the Best Decision. In The Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience, ed. John Bickle. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
[79] Kuhnen, Camelia M., and Brian Knutson. 2005. The neural basis of financial risk 
taking. Neuron, 47(5): 763–770. 
 32 
[80] Frot, Maud, Isabelle Faillenot, and François Mauguière. 2014. Processing of 
nociceptive input from posterior to anterior insula in humans. Human Brain Mapping, 
35(11): 5486–5499. 
[81] Crisp, Roger. 2016. Well-being. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward 
N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/well-being/. Accessed 2 
December 2016. 
[82] Hume, David. 1928 [1738-1740]. A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Lewis A. Selby-
Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
[83] Moore, George E. 1971 [1903]. Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
[84] Chapman, Gretchen B. 1996. Temporal discounting and utility for health and money. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 22(3): 771–791.  
[85] Chapman, Gretchen B., and Arthur S. Elstein. 1995. Valuing the future: Temporal 
discounting of health and money. Medical Decision Making, 15(4): 373–386.  
[86] Hausman, Jerry A. 1979. Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization 
of Energy-Using Durables. The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1): 33–54.  
[87] Rasmussen, Erin B., Steven R. Lawyer, and William Reilly. 2010. Percent body fat is 
related to delay and probability discounting for food in humans. Behavioral Processes, 
83(1): 23–30. 
[88] Bulley, Adam, Julie Henry, and Thomas Suddendorf. 2016. Prospection and the 
present moment: The role of episodic foresight in intertemporal choices between 
immediate and delayed rewards. Review of General Psychology, 20(1): 29–47. 
[89] Moffitt, Terrie E., Louise Arseneault, Daniel Belsky, Nigel Dickson, Robert J. 
Hancox, HonaLee Harrington, Renate Houts, Richie Poulton, Brent W. Roberts, Stephen 
Ross, Malcolm R. Sears, W. Murray Thomson, and Avshalom Caspi. 2011. A gradient of 
childhood self-control predicts health, wealth, and public safety. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 108(7): 2693–2698. 
[90] Romal, Jane B., and Barbara J. Kaplan. 1995. Difference in self-control among 
spenders and savers. Psychology, 32(2): 8–17. 
[91] D’Argembeau, Arnaud, and Martial Van Der Linden. 2004. Phenomenal 
characteristics associated with projecting oneself back into the past and forward into the 
future: Influence of valence and temporal distance. Consciousness and Cognition, 13(4): 
844–858.  
[92] Batson, C. Daniel, Early, S., and Salvarani, G. 1997. Perspective Taking: Imagining 
How Another Feels Versus Imaging How You Would Feel. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 23(7): 751–758.  
[93] Batson, C. Daniel, Jim Fultz, and Patricia A. Schoenrade. 1987. Distress and 
empathy: Two qualitatively distinct vicarious emotions with different motivational 
consequences. Journal of Personality, 55(1):19–39. 
[94] Pantaleo, Giuseppe, and Nicola Canessa. 2011. “Prospettive multiple”, 
comportamento prosociale e altruismo: oltre la civiltà dell’empatia. In Altruismo e 
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